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Appendix 
This appendix contains more complete information about the data and additional 
regressions to which the article published in Economic Inquiry refers. 
A. Are taxes lowered in response to IRTC? 
As discussed in the text in section IV.B.1, reverse causality between IRTC and cigarette 
taxes may cause downward bias in the estimated price coefficient. Since there are claims in the 
literature that some countries have responded to rising illicit trade by lowering cigarette taxes 
(Joossens & Raw, 2000)—albeit not for our countries and period—and also because reverse 
causality may invalidate our tax instruments, we investigate this further. First, there are few 
examples of cigarette taxes falling by any appreciable amount in the data, even though IRTC has 
been rising, particularly in Western Europe (see Figure 1 in the main text). Figure A.4 shows the 
trends in the real excise tax yield per cigarette (variable ExTax, from European Commission 
data) by country. The only countries with nontrivial decreases in cigarette taxes are Denmark and 
the UK The dip in 2012 in the tax yield per stick in Denmark appears to be merely an error in the 
EC report.0F1 The decrease in the real tax yield in the UK from 2007 to 2010 is an artifact of 
movements in the British pound versus the euro. The nominal tax rates (both specific and ad 
valorem) were either unchanged or increasing each of those years.1F2 
Nevertheless, we repeat estimation IV 3.2 without these two countries. The results in Table 
A.10 show that the price coefficient is higher (and still highly significant) with the smaller 
sample. However, given the relatively small difference in the two price coefficients compared to 
                                                          
1 Denmark switched from having a high ad valorem and a low specific tax to the opposite right around that time. 
The ad valorem rate is properly lowered in 2012 in the European Commission tax data, but the increase in the 
specific tax does not appear until the following year’s report. 
2 The ad valorem rate was 22% until November 2008, when it rose to 24%. The specific tax in nominal British 
pounds (the statutory currency) rose each year during the time in question. 
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their standard errors, there is no clear evidence against the consistency of the main estimates 
from IV 3.2. 
We also investigate reverse causality by regressing the excise taxes on twice-lagged IRTC 
shares. The double lag is prompted by the timing of when the Euromonitor and KPMG reports 
on IRTC are released: the earliest the reports could affect a full year’s worth of taxation is two 
years after the data year of the report. We explored many regression specifications, including two 
dependent variables (log hypothetical total excise tax, which is here named 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸, and log 
actual excise taxes) and various controls (country and year fixed effects only, or adding country-
specific linear trends, with or without the other control variables from the main regressions 
[corruption and GNI]). In none of the estimations was the coefficient on lagged IRTC significant 
at even the 10% level. Note that including the country-level trends also handles the potential 
criticism (raised by a referee) that officials do not lower the absolute level of taxes but limit how 
much they raise them in response to IRTC. 
B. Construction of the hypothetical and actual total excise taxes 
In section IV.B.1 of the text, a hypothetical excise tax is used as an instrument for cigarette 
prices. Here we describe how that variable, 𝐸𝐸ℎ as it is denoted here, is constructed. We begin 
with the following identities: 
𝑃𝑃ℎ = 𝑃𝑃0ℎ + 𝐸𝐸ℎ (A-1) 
𝐸𝐸ℎ = 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎ℎ  (A-2) 
In the expression, h superscripts are for hypothetical quantities. 𝑃𝑃ℎ is the tax-included retail 
sales price (TIRSP) with the hypothetical tax, 𝑃𝑃0ℎ is the pre-excise-tax base price to be used in 
constructing the hypothetical tax, and 𝐸𝐸ℎ is the hypothetical overall excise tax (i.e., the sum of 
the specific and ad valorem excise taxes). In equation (A-2), 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 is the actual amount-specific 
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excise tax (taken to be exogenous, thus also used for the hypothetical tax) and 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎ℎ  is the 
hypothetical ad valorem excise tax amount (not the rate). The actual ad valorem tax amount 
cannot be used since it was calculated from a base that was presumed to be endogenous. 
To calculate 𝑃𝑃ℎ, define α to be the ad valorem excise tax rate as a percentage of TIRSP. 
Rate α may vary from years to year and country to country. Treating the ad valorem tax as a 
fraction of TIRSP may appear odd, since TIRSP itself includes excise taxes. However, in the EU 
the ad valorem component is based on the maximum retail selling price inclusive of all taxes, 
which is set by the manufacturer or importer.2F3 
Then, from (A-1), (A-2), and by definition of α, we have 
𝑃𝑃ℎ = 𝑃𝑃0ℎ + 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃ℎ (A-3) 
or, after rearranging terms, 
𝑃𝑃ℎ = 𝑃𝑃0ℎ + 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎1 − 𝛼𝛼  (A-4) 
Combining (A-1) and (A-4) and rearranging terms yields the final expression for the hypothetical 
total excise tax: 
𝐸𝐸ℎ = 𝑃𝑃0ℎ + 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝑃𝑃0ℎ (A-5) 
Matching to the data described in the text, 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 is SpecTaxit and 𝛼𝛼 is AVtaxit, both given in 
the European Commission data (refer to Table A.2 for variable names and definitions). The base 
price 𝑃𝑃0ℎ, which is required to be plausibly exogenous since T
h will be used as an instrument, 
remains to be chosen. Define 𝑃𝑃0𝑎𝑎 to be the actual TIRSP less the overall actual excise tax (i.e., 
𝑃𝑃0
𝑎𝑎 = CigPriceit − ExTaxit). Then we choose 𝑃𝑃0ℎ for all observations to be the average value of 
𝑃𝑃0
𝑎𝑎 in the sample. Since the result does not vary over time, it cannot be endogenous due to time-
                                                          
3 See Council of the EU’s Directive 2011/64/EU (available from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:176:0024:0036:EN:PDF). 
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varying factors affecting actual prices. Since 𝑃𝑃0ℎ does not vary across countries, it cannot be 
correlated with endogenous country-specific factors. Instrument 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ varies over time and country 
because both 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 and α vary over both. As mentioned in the text, 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ can be viewed as a 
(nonlinear) combination of the two instruments SpecTax and AVtax to create a single instrument. 
Figure A.5 shows that log 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ is a highly relevant instrument for log cigarette prices and that the 
visual evidence for a monotonic relationship is strong. 
C. The separate impact of cigarette prices and taxes 
Since CigPrice = Ppre-excise-tax + ExTax, a linear additive specification is appropriate for the 
regressions in Table A.5. Therefore we switch to using price and tax levels instead of logs. In 
estimation FE A5.1, we first re-run the specification from FE 3.2 but with the price in levels 
instead of logs. The coefficient is not directly comparable to those in the previous tables due to 
switching away from the linear-log specification, but it is highly significant as before. The price 
coefficient of 0.733 means that a one euro cent increase in the cigarette price per stick would 
lead to an expected increase of 0.73 percentage points in illicit market share. That is a sizeable 
effect: the implied average price elasticity of illicit market share in the sample is 2.86. 
Separating the total price into its components yields estimation FE A5.2. The first regressor 
is the price including VAT but excluding ad valorem and specific excise taxes on tobacco, and 
the second regressor is the total excise tax per stick. The results show that if a distinction is to be 
made between tobacco-specific taxes and the rest of the price, then taxes are more important, 
both numerically and in terms of significance. An increase of 1 euro cent in the tax per stick is 
associated with a statistically significant increase of 1.5 percentage points in illicit market share. 
The implied tax elasticity of illicit market share is 3.2, which is similar to the total-price 
elasticities from FE 3.1 and 3.2. On the other hand, the non-tax part of the price has a smaller, 
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insignificant coefficient, with an associated elasticity of 0.48. Instrumenting the price with the 
SpecTax, AvTax, and their cross-product (estimation IV A5.1, also in A5) does not change the 
insignificance of the price coefficient, although it increases its size.  
Switching from the linear-log specification in the previous section to the fully linear 
specification here increases the chance that outliers in prices or taxes unduly influence the 
estimates. To investigate this possibility, the extra terms in a quadratic expansion in the tax and 
the rest of the price variables are added to estimation FE A5.3.3F4 The results indicate that the 
average marginal effect of taxes is 1.8 (asy. p-value = 0.04), compared to the linear coefficient of 
1.49 from the otherwise comparable estimation FE A5.2; prices and taxes are jointly significant 
at the 10% level. Coefficients on the higher-order terms are not jointly significant (p-value = 
0.84) and therefore do not appear to be necessary. 
D. A consumption gap analysis of illicit trade 
To complement the main estimations using the Euromonitor estimates of IRTC, we also 
calculated our own estimates of illicit market share. The consumption gap analysis in this section 
provides further evidence that higher licit cigarette prices have sizeable and statistically 
significant impacts on illicit market share, even when avoiding industry- and third-party 
estimates of IRTC. Following the approach suggested by Blecher (2010), we compare survey 
estimates of cigarette consumption within each country with licit sales and ascribe gaps between 
the two to consumption of illicitly obtained cigarettes. We begin with the identity that the 
quantity consumed in a country and year must equal the quantity supplied from all sources.4F5 
Sources of supply include 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆, domestic licit sales (including domestic production sold in-
                                                          
4 Since log price was the original regressor, this procedure can be formally justified as a second-order expansion 
(using Taylor’s Rule) of the function log 𝐸𝐸 = log(𝑟𝑟 + 𝑡𝑡), where p is the total price, t is the tax per stick, and r is the 
rest of the price.  
5 We thus set aside issues involving inventories, since cigarettes are perishable product. 
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country, legally imported and taxed foreign product sold in-country, and domestic sales 
purchased by foreign visitors). Another source of supply is 𝑄𝑄𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, foreign legal product that is 
brought into the market legally by consumers (such as during a cross-border trip). Domestic 
supply is reduced by 𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, domestic licit sales taken out of country by visitors. The final source 
of supply is 𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, counterfeit and contraband illicit product (whether produced domestically or 
from abroad). If there is outflow of domestically produced illicit product, it is netted out of 𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. 
Defining net foreign legal supply as 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = 𝑄𝑄𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 − 𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, the identity between domestic 
consumption 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷 and supply is thus 
𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷 = 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆 + 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (A-6) 
By definition, 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷 equals 𝑆𝑆, the number of smokers in the country, times 𝐴𝐴, the average 
smoking intensity. While 𝑆𝑆 can be reasonably well estimated from survey data, it is well known 
that 𝐴𝐴 is likely to be underreported (as ?̃?𝐴) by survey respondents (Warner, 1978; Merriman, 
2000). Assume that underreporting is by a constant multiple 0 < 𝜃𝜃 < 1, so that estimated 
consumption ignoring the misreporting is 𝑄𝑄�𝐷𝐷 = ?̃?𝐴𝑆𝑆 but that actual consumption is 
𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷 = 𝑄𝑄�𝐷𝐷/𝜃𝜃 (A-7) 
Rearranging the terms in equation (A-6) yields 
𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷 − 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆 − 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  
and so the illicit market share 𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶/𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷 , denoted 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 , is 
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷 − 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆 − 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷
= 1 − 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆 + 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝑄𝑄�𝐷𝐷
𝜃𝜃 
(A-8) 
Assume a linear fixed-effects regression model for 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, so that  
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽′𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (A-9) 
Equating the right sides of equations (A-8) and (A-9), we have: 
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1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆 + 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝑄𝑄�𝐷𝐷
= 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽′𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (A-10) 
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑆𝑆
𝑄𝑄�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝐷𝐷 = 1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃 − �𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃�′ 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − �𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑄𝑄�𝐷𝐷 �  (A-11) 
Define 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 to be 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 /𝑄𝑄�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 and let ?̈?𝐸 represent a variable 𝐸𝐸 that has been demeaned by the 
within transformation: ?̈?𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 1𝑇𝑇 ∑ 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖=1 . Then equation (A-10) after transformation 
becomes: 
?̈?𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = −�𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃�′ ?̈?𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A-12) 
where the new error term 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a mean-zero function of the terms in the final parentheses on the 
right side of equation (A-11) for all periods.  
If the original error 𝑢𝑢 was strictly exogenous in equation (A-9), and there is either no net 
foreign legal supply (𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = 0) or it is also strictly exogenous, then 𝑣𝑣 is exogenous in equation 
(A-12). However, if cigarette price is an element of 𝐸𝐸, it is likely correlated with 𝑣𝑣 through the 
term 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹/𝑄𝑄�𝐷𝐷. When licit prices rises within the country, then 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 may rise (as consumers 
obtain more cigarettes abroad and foreigners buy fewer cigarettes within the country) and 𝑄𝑄�𝐷𝐷 
may fall (since demand is responsive to price). Since 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹/𝑄𝑄�𝐷𝐷 enters 𝑣𝑣 negatively, price and the 
error term are therefore negatively correlated, and we thus expect there to be downward bias on 
the estimated coefficient −𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝/𝜃𝜃 on price in equation (A-11). The bias thus would exaggerate the 
estimate of 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝, the causal impact of price on actual IRTC. Conceptually, the bias occurs because 
part of the impact on observed “illicit trade”, as defined by the method above, will actually be 
increasing net foreign legal supply.  
There are three potential responses to this potential bias. The first would be to ignore it, as 
appears to have been done in previous literature (e.g., Blecher, 2010). The second would be to 
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gather data on net foreign legal supply, so that 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 could be moved out of the error term 𝑣𝑣. Since 
the only consistently calculated estimates of which we are aware for the EU during our entire 
period are those from KPMG in the Project Star reports, we do not follow this approach, since 
we wish to avoid using KPMG data where possible in this estimation. The third response, which 
we adopt, is to recognize the issue but argue that the results are illustrative nonetheless. The 
KPMG data indicate that foreign legal supply from border-crossing by consumers happens, as 
shown in Figure A.6, where it is labeled “non-domestic legal”. However, the figure also shows 
that it is a minor part of overall trade, more stable than illicit trade, and less responsive to price 
changes.5F6 During 2009-2011, for example, prices sharply increased but non-domestic legal 
consumption did not change. We thus anticipate (but cannot prove) that any bias is limited. 
Estimation of regression equation (A-12) yields estimates of coefficient vector 𝛽𝛽/𝜃𝜃, but the 
individual elements of 𝛽𝛽 are identified only to scale. Estimation of equation (A-12) by itself 
therefore can show whether price has a statistically significant effect on illicit trade share but 
cannot reveal the magnitude of the effect. If data on domestic consumption from KPMG are 
allowed into the estimation, then scalar 𝜃𝜃 can be identified. KPMG estimates domestic 
consumption for the EU in its Project Star reports. The largest part of consumption is from legal 
domestic sales, which are readily observed from industry and tax data. KPMG then adjusts the 
figures to arrive at total consumption by adjusting for non-domestic consumption as estimated 
from empty discarded pack studies.6F7 While the final consumption estimate relies on calculations 
and estimates by KPMG, the figures should be less contentious than the firm’s direct estimates of 
                                                          
6 The standard deviation of the non-domestic legal consumption figures in the graph is 0.6, whereas for illicit 
consumption it is 1.1. 
7 Empty pack surveys are based on a large sample of packs collected via formal sampling plans in various cities 
throughout the countries. Once packs are collected, they are examined to determine the proportion of packs that did 
not originate domestically. 
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IRTC. Treating the KPMG consumption data as 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷, equation (A-7) in logs can be treated as a 
second regression equation to estimate 𝜃𝜃.  
Data for 𝑆𝑆 and ?̃?𝐴 are taken from Eurobarometer (various years) surveys. Not all years are 
available.7F8 Furthermore, in some years, ?̃?𝐴 was not directly reported because survey responses 
were instead quantized (i.e., instead of mean cigarettes per day reported, the fraction of smokers 
falling into various consumption ranges was given). For such years, mean smoking intensity was 
estimated from the quantal data by fitting a lognormal distribution to the data via MLE and 
calculating the implied mean based on the results.8F9 With the resulting estimates of ?̃?𝐴 and 𝑆𝑆, 
estimates of 𝑄𝑄�𝐷𝐷 were formed as their product. Comparison of these estimates of 𝑄𝑄�𝐷𝐷 with the 
KPMG estimates of 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷 is in Figure A.7. The scatterplot shows that there is very high correlation 
between the two estimates (0.98). The slope of the line of best fit for the logged data, from 
estimation OLS A11.1 in the first column of Table A.11, is close to one, as it must be if equation 
(A-7) is correct.9F10 The implied value of 𝜃𝜃 from the regression is 0.63.10F11 Thus, for every 10 
cigarettes apparently actually consumed, smokers claim on average to have smoked only 6.3. 
The results of estimation of equation (A-12), with and without using KPMG data on 
domestic consumption, are in second and following columns of Table A.11. The dependent 
variable 𝐸𝐸 in the first equation is constructed using domestic licit sales data from Euromonitor 
for 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆. Estimation WI-OLS A11.1 (WI for within-transformed data) returns estimates of 𝛽𝛽/𝜃𝜃 
from OLS estimation on the pooled, demeaned data. The estimate-to-scale of the impact of 
cigarette price on illicit share is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. Estimation 
WI-OLS A11.2 is similar except that year fixed effects are accounted for; the estimate-to-scale 
                                                          
8 Eurobarometer surveys are available covering data from 1995, 2002, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2012, and 2014. 
9 Each country was allowed to have its own set of location and scale parameters for the lognormal distribution. 
10 The estimated slope of the line is 1.03, with 95% confidence interval spanning one [,1.097]. 
11 Given the log form of equation (A-7), 𝜃𝜃 is the exponentiated constant from the log-log regression. 
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of the impact of price on illicit share is now significant at the 1% level. These results bolster the 
main conclusions of the paper, namely that price increases spur illicit trade, without indicating 
the magnitude of the marginal effect. However, if the previous estimate of 𝜃𝜃 (from estimation 
OLS A11.1) is employed, the implied estimates of 𝛽𝛽 (the elasticity of illicit market share with 
respect to licit cigarette price) from estimations WI-OLS A11.1 and A11.2 are 0.30 and 0.47, 
respectively. These estimates are higher than the elasticities found from the fixed-effects 
estimates reported in Table 3 (perhaps due to the bias discussed above). 
The final two columns of Table A.11 contains estimates of 𝛽𝛽 and 𝜃𝜃 separately, estimated 
from nonlinear seemingly unrelated regression (NLSUR) estimation of equation (A-12) and the 
log form of equation (A-7).11F12 Joint estimation can improve the precision of the estimates, as well 
as identifying 𝛽𝛽. Estimation NLSUR A11.1 does not include year fixed effects, while NLSUR 
A11.2 does. The implied elasticities of illicit market share with respect to price are 0.41 and 
0.56. Again, these estimates are higher than those from Table 3. The estimates of 𝜃𝜃 are quite 
close to those from estimation OLS A11.1, and are significant at the 5% level.12F13 In summary, the 
work here using the consumption gap analysis corroborates the finding in the paper that 
increasing the licit price of cigarettes (e.g., through taxation) has sizeable and statistically 
significant impacts on IRTC. 
E. Alternative measures of corruption and governance 
The estimations in Table A.7 employ alternative regressors to NotCorrupt, which is from 
the World Bank. Here these alternatives are described. Two measures from Transparency 
International are employed.13F14 The first is the Corruption Perceptions Index, for which higher 
values indicate less corruption. Before a methodological change in 2012, the index was valid for 
                                                          
12 Estimation is with the nlsur command in Stata 14.1.  
13 The transformation from the estimated ln(θ) to the reported θ is accomplished with the nlcom command. 
14 Data are from transparency.org, from which the Excel spreadsheet “cpi 1995_2013.xls” was obtained. 
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cross-sectional comparison of countries but not across years. Therefore in estimation FE A7.1 
using this variable, year fixed effects are included to remove the changes over time due solely to 
the noncomparability of the data across years. The other variable from the same source is the 
country’s cross-sectional rank of its Corruption Perceptions Index. The ranks are rescaled to the 
unit interval to account for differing number of countries in different years. This variable is 
another attempt to account for the inherent noncomparability of the index across years. This 
variable is used in estimation FE A7.2. 
The World Bank dataset from which NotCorrupt was drawn, World Governance Indicators, 
also contains indices of the rule of law and the effectiveness of government in the country. The 
former measure reflects perceptions of the extent to which “agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.”14F15 The latter measures 
“perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.”15F16 For both indices a higher 
score indicates stronger governance. Years 1999 and 2001 are unavailable and were linearly 
interpolated. These data are constructed to be appropriate for use in panel data, and are 
comparable in the cross-section and the time-series. The rule of law variable is used in estimation 
FE A7.3. Similar estimations with the government effectiveness index yielded nearly identical 
results (which is unsurprisingly, given the 95% correlation between the two regressors) and 
therefore are not shown in the tables. 
                                                          
15 See info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/rl.pdf. 
16 While the government effectiveness index may appear to be less germane to IRTC than the other corruption and 
governance measures, we included it because Melzer (2010) found it to be significant in some of her cross-sectional 
regressions of illicit cigarette consumption share. 
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Data from the United Nations on total police personnel at the national level per 100,000 
people are taken from UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).16F17 The counts include 
personnel in public agencies whose principal functions are the prevention, detection and 
investigation of crime and the apprehension of alleged offenders, excluding administrative 
support staff. Since there were many missing values, linear interpolation was used to fill in the 
gaps in the data. See estimation FE A7.4. 
The results employing these alternative measures, in Table A.7, are highly similar to 
estimation FE 3.2. Whether the alternative regressors are included singly or jointly (the latter in 
the last column), the coefficient on price remains highly significant.17F18 Furthermore, the size of 
the price coefficient is similar as that found in estimation OLS 2.3, ranging from 0.18 to 0.23. 
F. Alternative IRTC-relevant factors in other countries 
As mentioned in the main text, many IRTC-relevant variables reflecting conditions outside 
the home country have been proposed in the literature. Rather than arbitrarily choosing one of 
the available measures, we computed many alternatives to show that the regression results are 
generally similar regardless of which measures are included. The variables explored here are: 
1. LowPrDistEU: The distance (in 1000 km) to the closest EU country with lower real 
cigarette prices.18F19 EU countries are differentiated from other countries between this 
variable and the next because travel and transport of goods is easier within most of the 
EU, due to the lack of border control and free trade among states. Transcrime (2015) 
                                                          
17 See unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/United-Nations-Surveys-on-Crime-Trends-and-the-Operations-of-
Criminal-Justice-Systems.html. 
18 Results for the index on government effectiveness are not shown in the tables since they are nearly identical to 
those for the index on the rule of law. 
19 Distances for this and succeeding variables are calculated between the closest major cities (defined as having 
population greater than 500,000 or the largest in the country) in the pair of countries, per shortest driving distance 
found from Google Maps.  
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states that the most frequent (but not the highest volume) illicit flows are characterized by 
geographic proximity. The top two such countries are Poland and the Netherlands. 
2. LowPrDistNonEU: The distance (in 1000 km) to the closest country outside the EU with 
lower cigarette prices. For about half of the data, the closest such country is Switzerland, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, or Algeria. 
3. CChubDist: The distance (in 1000 km) to the closest major hub for contraband and 
counterfeit (CC) cigarettes in Europe, where the three such areas are Russia, Turkey, and 
the Northeast Criminal Hub of Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and the Russian exclave of 
Kaliningrad.19F20 Transcrime (2015) finds that the highest volume of illicit cigarette flows 
originate mainly from outside the EU, often entering through these hubs. 
4. MaxPdiff: The maximum difference in cigarette prices between the home country and 
contiguous countries (whether or not the other countries are in the EU). Contiguous 
countries are the easiest sources to access for bootlegging and casual smuggling. Cross-
border prices have been found to be associated with cigarette smuggling by Baltagi and 
Levin (1986), Saba et al. (1995), Thursby and Thursby (2000), Stehr (2005), Chiou and 
Muehlegger (2008), and Goel (2008). 
5. MinPratio: The minimum over all contiguous countries of the ratio of the other country’s 
price to the home country’s price. 
6. MaxPdiffKM: The maximum price difference per km between the home country and any 
other European country in the dataset (whether or not the other countries are in the EU).  
If IllicitMktShare is a true measure of IRTC and prices increase IRTC, then we expect 
LowPrDistEU, LowPrDistNonEU, CChubDist, and MinPratio to have negative coefficients and 
                                                          
20 There are other areas of significant smuggling activity, for example in and through the Balkans, but the chosen 
three areas supply most of the illicit product for other areas. For example, the product often reaches the Balkan 
countries from Turkey via Greece (Europol, 2011). 
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MaxPdiff and MaxPdiffKM to have positive coefficients. The first regression results with these 
additional IRTC-relevant variables are in Table A.8, where the new regressors are added singly 
to the regression specification from estimation OLS 2.3. The coefficients all have the expected 
sign, although some are significant only at the 10% level. Further investigation of MaxPdiff 
revealed nonlinearities in its marginal effect on IRTC, and so in regression OLS A8.5 it enters 
the specification with a three-part linear spline.20F21 Up to its median in the sample (a real price 
difference of 0.074€/stick, or 1.48€/pack, in licit prices), MaxPdiff has the expected positive, 
significant marginal effect on IRTC share. Between the median and the 90th percentile 
(0.16€/stick) there is no significant effect of MaxPdiff, while beyond the 90th percentile, the 
marginal effect again turns positive (p = 0.077). Note also that the own-country price effect is 
highly significant and about the same magnitude in all these regressions as in OLS 2.3.  
In the next set of regression results (Table A.9), groups of other-country variables enter the 
regression at once. Since some of these variables are proxies for similar notions, it does not make 
sense to add all of them at once.21F22 Examining all possible combinations among these choices 
yields the four regressions in Table A.9.22F23 We show the results for all combinations of these 
variables to show that the choice of which to include does not affect the results. The most 
relevant statistic in Table A.9, shown in the last row, is the p-value from the joint hypothesis test 
that the coefficients on all the included other-country variables are zero. This is our omnibus test 
of whether these other-country variables have no impact on IRTC. In two of the regressions, 
OLS A9.1 and OLS A9.3, the hypothesis is rejected at better than the 1% level. In the other two, 
                                                          
21 The knots were place at the median and 90th percentiles based on visual inspection of the partial fit resulting from 
a Generalized Additive Model estimation with specification like OLS Error! Reference source not found..3 with 
the addition of MaxPdiff entering flexibly. 
22 Although if we do, the F-test for their joint significance has a p-value of 0.004. 
23 To avoid near multicollinearity, only a single variable pertaining to the distance to a source outside the EU for 
illicit product (LowPrDistNonEU or CChubDist) is used in any one regression. Similarly, only a single variable 
comparing the home country’s price with prices in its contiguous neighbors (MaxPdiff or MinPratio) enters any one 
specification. 
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rejection is at the 5% level. The results of all these estimations and tests strongly support the 
conclusion that higher licit prices and price differentials with other locations lead to higher illicit 
market shares due to smuggling.  
G. Calculation of change in illicit share due to a 1€ tax increase 
For the market share, the estimated change due to the price increase for a country and year 
is 
Δ𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿Δ𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
and the average discrete change is 
𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁(Δ𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)) = 𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁(Δ𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
where 𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁 denotes the (unweighted) empirical average operator. The confidence interval is 
calculated by multiplying the endpoints of the wild cluster bootstrap confidence interval for 
𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 by the second term in the above expression.  
For the illicit quantity, the calculation is more involved since the dependent variable is in 
logs. Since  
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = exp(𝛽𝛽′𝐸𝐸1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
it follows that the percentage change in quantity due to the price increase is  exp�𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿Δ𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� 
where the simplifying assumption that 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 does not change is maintained. Applying this 
expression to the actual quantities and averaging yields 
𝐸𝐸(Δ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖exp�𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿Δ𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� 
Asymptotic standard errors for these estimates are calculated via plugging the endpoints of the 
bootstrap confidence interval for 𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿into the above expression before averaging. 
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H. Information about cigarette excise taxes 
In the EU, most countries have a minimum excise duty (MED) for cigarettes. These vary 
widely among countries. For example, in 2014 Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, and Romania has 
MEDs below €80 per 1,000 cigarettes, while the MED in Finland, Ireland, and the Netherlands 
was more than twice that level.23F24 Actually excise yields also vary widely, from €76.3 per 1,000 
cigarettes in Lithuania to 289.9 per 1,000 cigarettes in the UK (also in 2014). Taxes also change 
greatly over time in some countries: the real total excise yield in 2014, compared to levels in 
1999, rose 89% in the Netherlands, 92% in France, and 159% in Spain. On the other hand, the 
real 2014 total excise yield in Denmark was 3% lower than in 1999 and was only 12% higher in 
Finland. There is thus good variation in taxes across years and countries to help identify the 
marginal effects of prices on IRTC. The large variation in actual taxes is reflected in variation in 
the hypothetical total excise tax instrument, which has an overall s.d. of 0.043 in the data, a 
“between country” s.d. of 0.038, and a “within country” s.d. 0.017 (compared to a mean value of 
€ 0.109 per cigarette).  
All countries in the data have both ad valorem and specific excise taxes. There is a negative 
correlation between the two; some countries have higher specific taxes and lower ad valorem 
taxes, and vice versa. The fraction of the total excise tax that comes from the specific per-unit 
component therefore varies widely. A scatter plot of the two, using data from Euromonitor, is 
shown in Figure A.8. The VAT is applied on top of “taxes, duties, levies and charges, excluding 
the VAT itself” per EU rules of taxation, 24F25 and so the impact of the excise taxes on final 
consumer prices is multiplied. The tax rates change frequently. In 44% of the observations, the 
                                                          
24 See footnote Error! Bookmark not defined. for the data source. 
25 See http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/vat/eu-vat-rules-topic/taxable-amount_en. 
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ad valorem rate changed in the country since the previous year. The specific tax changed 85% of 
the time.  
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Appendix Tables 
Table A.1: Countries and years included in the data 
Country First year 
Austria 1999 
Belgium 1999 
Bulgaria 2007 
Croatia 2013 
Czech Republic 2004 
Denmark 1999 
Estonia 2004 
Finland 2000 
France 1999 
Germany 1999 
Greece 1999 
Hungary 2004 
Ireland 1999 
Country First year 
Italy 1999 
Latvia 2004 
Lithuania 2004 
Netherlands 1999 
Poland 2004 
Portugal 1999 
Romania 2007 
Slovakia 2004 
Slovenia 2004 
Spain 1999 
Sweden 2000 
United Kingdom 1999 
 
Note: The last year of data is 2014 for all countries. The differing first years are generally due to countries 
joining the EU. Not all country-years appear in all estimations, due to missing values of regressors. 
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Table A.2: Variables and definitions 
Variable Name Definition Source 
LicitQty licit cigarette quantity (million sticks) Euromonitor 
IllicitQty illicit cigarette quantity (million sticks) Euromonitor 
IllicitMktShare illicit market share: IllicitQty/( LicitQty + IllicitQty) Authors’ calculations 
CigPrice cigarette price per stick, calculated as average revenue Euromonitor 
PriceLessTax cigarette price per stick, not including excise tax Euromonitor 
ExTaxHypo hypothetical total excise tax European Commission 
LaborTax total revenue from taxes on employed labor income as a 
percentage of GDP 
TCU Eurostat (2014) 
FiscalFreedom index of fiscal freedom from the Index of Economic 
Freedom 
Heritage Foundation 
VAT general VAT as a percentage of retail sales price Euromonitor 
SpecTax specific excise tax per stick European Commission 
AVtax ad valorem excise tax rate on cigarettes, as a percentage 
of retail sales price 
European Commission 
ExTax excise tax on cigarettes per stick (does not include VAT) European Commission 
Pop15 Population age 15 and up World Bank 
LowPrDistEU the distance (in 1000 km) to the closest EU country with 
a lower cigarette price. 
Authors’ calculations 
LowPrDistNonEU the distance (in 1000 km) to the closest country outside 
the EU with a lower real average cigarette price 
Authors’ calculations 
CChubDist The distance (in 1000 km) to the closest major hub for 
contraband and counterfeit cigarettes in Europe: Russia, 
Turkey, or the Northeast Criminal Hub of Lithuania, 
Estonia, Latvia, and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad 
Authors’ calculations 
MaxPdiff the maximum difference in cigarette prices between the 
home country and contiguous countries 
Authors’ calculations 
MinPratio the minimum over all contiguous countries of the ratio of 
the other country’s price to the home country’s price 
Authors’ calculations 
MaxPdiffKM the maximum price difference per km between the home 
country and any other country included in the dataset 
Authors’ calculations 
GNIpc gross national income (GNI; Atlas method) per capita 
(€1,000) 
World Bank WGI 
NotCorrupt control of corruption, an index measuring “perceptions of 
the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private 
interests” (the index ranges from -2.5 [governance] to 2.5 
[g governance]). 
World Bank WGI 
Note: all monetary amounts are converted to real 2010 euros.  
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Table A.3: Summary statistics for additional variables 
Variable Obs Mean S.d. Min Max 
      
PriceLessTax 262 0.075 0.034 0.006 0.196 
LowPrDistEU 287 0.479 0.537 0.065 3.610 
LowPrDistNonEU 302 0.587 0.372 0.065 2.450 
CChubDist 302 1.130 0.779 0.088 3.270 
MaxPdiff 301 0.070 0.063 -0.094 0.243 
MinPratio 301 0.589 0.325 0.109 1.376 
      
Data cover years 1999 to 2014; some years are unavailable for some variables. See Table 1 for statistics 
for the main set of variables. 
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Table A.4: First-stage regressions for the IV regressions of IRTC share on cigarette prices 
Y = Log(real cigarette price) IV 3.1, 1st stage IV 3.2, 1st stage 
Hypothetic excise tax (ExTaxHypo) 0.474    
 (0.057)***  
Ad valorem tax rate (AdVal)  0.029 
  (0.004)*** 
Specific tax (SpecTax)  0.406 
  (0.057)*** 
AdVal × SpecTax  -0.005 
  (0.001)*** 
Freedom from Corruption (WGI) 0.136** 0.175 
 (0.067) (0.074)** 
Income (GNI) per capita (€1,000) 0.013 0.008 
 (0.013) (0.011) 
GNI per capita squared -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
N 327 327 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; asymptotic SE’s (in parentheses) account for clustering by country. 
Note: Both estimations include country and year fixed effects. 
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Table A.5: Fixed-effects panel regressions of IRTC share on cigarette prices and taxes 
Y = illicit market share FE A5.1 FE A5.2 IV A5.1 FE A5.3 
Real cigarette price, including tax 0.733    
(0.224)***    
Real cigarette price, not including 
excise tax 
 0.312 -2.268 0.216 
 (0.378) (2.502) (0.954) 
p-value from wild bootstrap  [0.443] [0.411] [0.786] 
Real excise tax per stick  1.490 3.362 2.608 
  (0.616)** (1.354)** (1.878) 
p-value from wild bootstrap  [0.007] [0.464] [0.352] 
Freedom from Corruption (WGI) 0.021 0.025 -0.003 0.040 
(0.029) (0.037) (0.045) (0.034) 
Income (GNI) per capita (€1,000) -0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.005 
 (0.008) (0.019) (0.016) (0.012) 
GNI per capita squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Real cigarette price, not including 
excise tax, squared 
   -10.065 
   (11.088) 
Real excise tax per stick, squared    -8.738 
   (10.260) 
(Cigarette price w/o excise 
tax)×(excise tax per stick) 
   14.806 
   (17.221) 
Joint test of all price & tax 
coefficients (asy. p-value) 
   0.073 
Joint test of price & tax higher-order 
coefficients (asy. p-value) 
   0.842 
N 327 262 261 262 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; asymptotic SE’s (in parentheses) account for clustering by country. 
Note: In estimation IV A5.1, the instruments for price are as in IV 3.2. All estimations include country and year fixed effects. 
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Table A.6: Fixed-effects panel regressions of IRTC share on cigarette prices (WLS and alternative dependent variable) 
Y = illicit market share FE A6.1 FE A6.2 FE A6.3 IV A6.1 IV A6.2 
 Country FE  
+ Year FE 
Country fixed  
effects (FE) 
Country FE  
+ Year FE 
Instrument:  
total tax 
Instruments: Tax 
components 
Source for dependent variable: Euromonitor KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG 
Log(real cigarette price) 0.167 0.148 0.192 0.233 0.256 
 (0.018)*** (0.072)* (0.098)* (0.131)* (0.127)** 
p-value from wild bootstrap: [0.000] *** [0.019] ** [0.041] ** [0.222] [0.153] 
Freedom from Corruption (WGI) -0.002 0.009 -0.008 0.003 -0.002 
 (0.014) (0.027) (0.031) (0.035) (0.034) 
Income (GNI) per capita (€1,000) -0.012 0.002 0.002 -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.004)*** (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) 
GNI per capita squared 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Implied price elasticity  3.45 4.49 5.47 6.03   
Weighted least squares estimation Y N N N N 
Year fixed effects Y N Y Y Y 
1st stage F statistic on excluded 
instruments 
   105.32 43.61 
Sargan-Hansen statistic (p-value)     0.045 
N 302 187 187 184 184 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; asymptotic SE’s (in parentheses) account for clustering by country. 
Note: p-values (in square brackets) are calculated using the wild cluster bootstrap (see notes to Table 2). In estimation FE A6.1, the observations 
are weighted by the population aged 15 years or more. In estimation IV A6.1, the instruments for price are the hypothetical total excise tax as 
described in the text; in IV A6.2 instruments are the ad valorem excise tax rate, the specific tax rate, and their product. All estimations include 
country fixed effects. 
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Table A.7: Fixed-effects panel regressions of IRTC share on cigarette prices (alternative corruption and rule of law regressors) 
 FE A7.1 FE A7.2 FE A7.3 FE A7.4 FE A7.5 
Y = illicit market share Coef. (se) Coef. (se) Coef. (se) Coef. (se) Coef. (se) 
Log(real cigarette price) 0.184 0.199 0.178 0.226 0.231 
 (0.086)** (0.095)** (0.084)** (0.092)** (0.094)** 
Wild bootstrap p-value [0.017] [0.018] [0.012] [0.008] [0.018] 
Corruption Perceptions Index (TPI) -0.000    -0.000 
 (0.001)    (0.001) 
Corruption Rank (TPI)  0.154   0.114 
  (0.195)   (0.165) 
Rule of Law (WGI)   0.025  0.098 
   (0.053)  (0.056)* 
Police per 100,000 people    -0.000 -0.000 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
Income (GNI) per capita (€1,000) -0.008 -0.005 -0.009 -0.013 -0.019 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.004)** (0.005)*** (0.015) 
GNI per capita squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)* (0.000) 
N 302 302 327 305 281 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; asymptotic SE’s (in parentheses) account for clustering by country. 
Note: All estimations include country and year fixed effects. 
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Table A.8: Pooled OLS regressions of IRTC share on other-country IRTC-relevant variables 
 OLS A8.1 OLS A8.2 OLS A8.3 OLS A8.4 OLS A8.5 OLS A8.6 OLS A8.7 
Y = illicit market share Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) 
Log(real cigarette price) 0.091 0.115 0.115 0.080 0.081 0.095 0.097 
 (0.032)*** (0.031)*** (0.034)*** (0.029)** (0.029)** (0.030)*** (0.028)*** 
Distance to closest EU -0.035       
country with lower price (0.011)***       
Distance to closest non-EU  -0.043      
country with lower price  (0.023)*      
Distance to closest    -0.025     
smuggling area   (0.012)*     
Max. price difference with     0.258    
contiguous countries (X1)    (0.137)*    
Max. price difference     0.586   
(X1) below its median     (0.277)**   
Max. price diff. (X1) between its      -0.368   
median and 90th percentile     (0.493)   
Max. price diff. (X1) above its      0.802   
90th percentile     (0.435)*   
Minimum ratio: other contiguous      -0.056  
country price ÷ own price      (0.032)*  
Max. price difference/KM       66.682 
       (27.686)** 
Freedom from Corruption  0.003 -0.006 -0.010 -0.010 0.000 -0.008 -0.020 
(WGI) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.015) (0.017) 
Income (GNI) per capita  -0.020 -0.021 -0.017 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.020 
(€1,000) (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)*** 
GNI per capita squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
constant 0.547 5.66 0.581 0.470 0.456 0.538 0.528 
 (0.115)*** 0.352 (0.118)*** (0.101)*** (0.106)*** (0.106)*** (0.093)*** 
F 4.15 0.341 4.54 4.50 8.66 4.52 6.25 
R^2 0.375  0.368 0.361 0.377 0.367 0.377 
Adjusted R^2 0.364  0.357 0.350 0.362 0.356 0.366 
N 287 302 302 301 301 301 302 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; SE’s (in parentheses) account for clustering by country. 
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Table A.9: Additional Pooled OLS regressions of IRTC share on other-country IRTC-relevant variables 
 OLS 9.1 OLS 9.2 OLS 9.3 OLS 9.4 
Y = illicit market share Coefficient (s.e.) Coefficient (s.e.) Coefficient (s.e.) Coefficient (s.e.) 
Log(real cigarette price) 0.079 0.084 0.100 0.101 
 (0.043)* (0.040)** (0.023)*** (0.027)*** 
Distance to closest EU country with -0.031 -0.034 -0.030 -0.035 
lower price (0.012)** (0.011)*** (0.013)** (0.011)*** 
Distance to closest non-EU country with 0.014 0.017   
lower price (0.050) (0.048)   
Distance to closest smuggling area   -0.015 -0.011 
   (0.014) (0.016) 
Max. price difference with contiguous 0.131  0.022  
countries (X1) below its median (0.282)  (0.333)  
Max. price diff. (X1) between its  -0.330  -0.519  
median and 90th percentile (0.550)  (0.480)  
Max. price diff. (X1) above its  0.753  0.981  
90th percentile (0.431)*  (0.421)**  
Minimum ratio: other contiguous country’s  -0.004  0.020 
price ÷ home country price  (0.046)  (0.042) 
Maximum price difference/KM 73.389 71.191 65.407 64.642 
 (30.507)** (35.014)* (31.829)* (36.316)* 
Freedom from Corruption (WGI) -0.011 -0.013 -0.011 -0.013 
 (0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) 
Income (GNI) per capita (€1,000) -0.020 -0.020 -0.019 -0.021 
 (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)*** 
GNI per capita squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
_cons 0.495 0.518 0.564 0.567 
 (0.140)*** (0.125)*** (0.106)*** (0.106)*** 
F (all regressors) 5.76 3.33 6.40 3.68 
R^2 0.426 0.418 0.432 0.420 
Adjusted R^2 0.405 0.401 0.411 0.403 
N 287 287 287 287 
P-value for H0: all other-country coefficients are zero 0.0050 0.0302 0.0022 0.0189 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; asy. SE’s (in parentheses) account for clustering by country.  
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Table A.10: Fixed-effects panel regressions of IRTC share on cigarette prices (reduced sample) 
 
Y = illicit market share 
IVA10.1 
Instrument:  
Total tax 
IVA10.2 
Instruments: Tax 
components 
Log(real cigarette price) 0.465 0.488 
 (0.176)*** (0.182)*** 
 p-value from wild bootstrap: [0.016]** [0.0198]** 
Freedom from Corruption (WGI) -0.054 -0.060 
 (0.062) (0.065) 
Income (GNI) per capita (€1,000) -0.019 -0.020 
 (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
GNI per capita squared 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)* (0.000)* 
Implied price elasticity 7.717 8.104 
1st stage F statistic on excluded instruments 55.25 29.80 
Sargan-Hansen statistic (p-value)  0.756 
N 295 295 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; SE’s (in parentheses) account for clustering by country using the standard asymptotic formula. 
Note: Sample excludes Denmark and the UK. The instruments are as in Table 3; see notes to that table. Country and year fixed effects are 
included. 
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Table A.11: Estimations for the consumption gap analysis 
 
 OLS A11.1 WI-OLS A11.1 WI-OLS A11.2 NLSUR A11.1 NLSUR A11.2 
 θ β/θ  β/θ β  β 
Equation (A-12)      
Log(real cigarette price)  0.481 0.745 0.406 0.558 
  (0.184)** (0.215)*** (0.200)** (0.272)** 
Income (GNI) per capita 
(€1,000) 
 0.017 0.023 0.019 0.021 
  (0.018) (0.028) (0.013) (0.016) 
GNI per capita squared  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)* (0.000)* 
Equation (A-7) in log form      
Coefficient on 𝑄𝑄�𝐷𝐷 1.029   1.028 1.028 
 (0.033)***   (0.032)*** (0.033)*** 
Log(θ)  -0.460   -0.476 -0.482 
 (0.308)   (0.302) (0.311) 
θ 0.631   0.621 0.617 
 (0.194)†*   (0.188) †** (0.192) †** 
Within-transformed data  N Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects N N Y N Y 
N 98 103 103 74 74 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; SE’s (in parentheses) account for clustering by country. 
† Significance stars for θ are for the null hypothesis that θ = 1. 
Note: Estimates from the WI-OLS estimation are for β/θ from equation (A-12), and thus are not comparable to the direct estimates of β from the 
NLSUR estimations. The within-transformation and year fixed effects are for equation (A-7) only, when included.  
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Appendix Figures 
Figure A.1. Estimated volume of illicit European trade in cigarettes 
 
Notes: Data from Euromonitor. Western Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom; Eastern Europe includes Belarus, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. 
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Figure A.2: Cigarette prices and IRTC shares in the EU, 1999-2014 
 
Notes: The line of best fit is calculated via OLS regression. See also notes to Figure 2. 
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Figure A.3: Cigarette prices and taxes in the EU, 1999-2014 
 
Notes: The line of best fit is calculated via OLS regression (R2 = 0.934). Variables constructed using source data from Euromonitor and the 
European Commission as described in the text. Currency units are 2010 euros. 
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Figure A.4: Trends in cigarette excise taxes per stick (ExTax) 
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Figure A.5: Relevance and monotonicity of the hypothetical excise tax instrument 
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Figure A.6: Data from KPMG Project Star for cigarette consumption and prices in the EU 
 
Note: Price are national averages weighted by population. The data source is KPMG Project Star reports, various years. 
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Figure A.7: Stated cigarette consumption vs. estimated actual consumption  
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Figure A.8: Components of cigarette excise taxes 
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